Appointing directors to affiliated companies is common practice to reinforce control or build connections under the familial-oriented culture in East Asia. This paper investigates whether outside appointments entrench board monitoring effectiveness on management investment behaviour for Taiwanese firms. The results show that investments are significantly related to internal cash flow. However, no economically significant relationship exists between multiple directorships and investment-cash flow sensitivity, indicating that the outside appointments of chairpersons neither aggregate nor alleviate managerial discretion problem on investment in this sample. We also provide explanations for the results.
Introduction
In theory, the financial structure of a firm is irrelevant to investment because external funds provide a perfect substitute for internal capital. With perfect market assumption, the investment decisions of a firm are independent of its financial condition (Modigliani and Miller 1958) . However, Myers and Majluf (1984) propose that misaligned managerial incentives and asymmetric information in the capital market usually cause misuse of cash flow and investment distortions. Subsequent studies have found relationships between investment expenditure and cash flow (Fazzari et al., 1988; Hoshi et al., 1991; Almeida et al., 2004) . This study extends the scope of corporate governance by examining the relationship between board composition and investment, specifically on the impact of multiple directorships on firm investment decisions.
Under the agency view, inadequate investment could be the result of misused free cash flow. By utilizing free cash flow to finance projects internally, managers could avoid monitoring capital markets when the firm needs new capital. Such investment increases their control power and causes firms to grow beyond their optimal size. Jensen (1986) suggests that debt creation and hostile takeovers can reduce agency costs by reducing the cash flow available for spending at the discretion of managers. In addition to controlling internal cash flow, board monitoring is considered an alternative mechanism to reduce organization inefficiencies. For example, Core et al. (1999) use the percentage of outside directors over the age of 69 and the percentage of busy outside directors as proxy to measure effectiveness of outside directors. They find that firms with lower outside director effectiveness are more likely to pay higher compensation to chief executive officers (CEOs) and cause inferior performance.
The monitoring effectiveness of directors" outside appointments has been concerned. Fich and White (2003) find that CEOs in companies with board interlocking have excessive salary and lower turnover. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) state that firms with busy outside directors exhibit lower market-to-book ratios, weaker profitability, and lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance. These findings question directors" effectiveness and comprise the Busyness Hypothesis.
In contrast, some studies suggest that external appointments are associated with firm success. Cotter et al. (1997) find that shareholders have larger premiums in tender offers when directors hold multiple directorships. Ferris et al. (2003) compare the committee service of multiple directors with that of non-multiple directors. They find that directors serve on more committees, attend more committee meetings, and have no relationship between the number of directorships and the likelihood of securities fraud litigation. Donato and Tiscini (2009) provide evidence that interlocking directorates between banks and listed firms increase the cost of debt and the level of indebtness of non-financial firms. They explaine that the bank-firm connection will increase the bargaining power of the former when banks hold equity interests of the firm, and the bank appoints fiduciary directors in the board of the firm. Perry and Peyer (2005) find that shareholders have a positive reaction when executives join a firm in a similar industry or with greater growth opportunities. They propose that executives can benefit the sender firms through industry-specific knowledge transfer or by learning new technologies, products, or management innovation.
However, few studies relate multiple directorships to corporate investment. Building on prior studies, this research studies whether multiple directorships affect the investment decision of managers. If directors who serve on several committees become busy and evade monitoring duties, then firms with multiple directorships are more likely to have inadequate investment and higher investment-cash flow sensitivity due to ineffective monitoring on management. However, if joining outside firms signals the ability of directors or helps them learn managerial expertise among interlocked firms (Ferris et al., 2003) , multiple directorships may relate to higher managerial expertise. As a result, firms appointing directors to other companies may benefit from monitoring effectiveness, including fewer inefficient investment decisions. This will cause a lower degree of investment-cash flow sensitivity.
We use a panel data set consisting of 7,476 firmyear observations in Taiwan Our results show that investments are significantly related to internal cash flow. This implies the possibility of an overinvestment or underinvestment under managerial discretion in Taiwanese firms. This finding agrees with theoretical predictions and empirical findings in the US and the UK. We do not discover economically significant relationships between multiple directorships and investment-cash flow sensitivity. Thus, the premise that the outside appointments of chairpersons aggregate or alleviate managerial discretion problem on investment is not proven in Taiwanese firms. The findings differ from the Busyness Hypothesis, but are in line with the claim of (Ferris et al. 2003 ) that there is no evidence that directors appointed to multiple boards avoid their responsibilities. We provide two explanations. First, there is a tradeoff between the advantage and disadvantage of multiple directorships. Second, the governance function through interlocking directorates might be absent innately based on the familial culture in East Asia.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides director interlocking and corporate governance in the Taiwan context; Section 3 describes the data and the model; Section 4 analyzes results; and Section 5 presents the conclusions.
The Taiwan context
Like most countries in East Asia, the Taiwan corporate governance system features a high concentration of ownership. Controlling shareholders usually build power through direct shareholding, cross shareholding and stock pyramids. As mentioned by Claessens et al. (2000) , controlling shareholdings usually result in excessive cash flow right and a conflict of interests between controlling and minority shareholders. Several studies found entrenchment to minority shareholders and include Taiwan as an example. For example, La Porta et al. (2002) find that firms with controlling shareholder and higher cashflow ownership have higher valuation, which is not found in firms with controlling shareholder and low cash-flow ownership. Fan and Wong (2002) provide evidence that controlling ownership in East Asia is associated with opacity and low information on earnings because controlling owners tend to report accounting information for self-interest. Du and Dai (2005) note that controlling shareholders with small ownership share in East Asia are more likely to construct a risky capital structure owing to increased leverage through external finance and will not dilute their shareholding dominance. Another characteristic of corporate governance in Taiwan is that many public companies are dominated by families. Although family control has the potential advantage of strong leadership and cohesive management teams (Yeh et al. 2001 ), family-controlled businesses are usually associated with insider trading and tunneling, leading to expropriation of minority shareholders (Cheung et al. 2006) . Including direct and indirect shareholdings of nominal agents and other institutions controlled by families, Yeh et al. (2001) show that about 76% of listed firms in Taiwan are family controlled when fixing the critical control level to 20%. They provide evidence that when family control is central, low levels of family ownership and high levels of family board representation increase the conflict of interest between majority and minority shareholders.
The governance features of concentrated ownership and family dominance significantly influence board composition in Taiwan under Chinese cultural norms. As mentioned by Fan (2002) , family ties and guanxi (connections) to the state and related parties are vital in managing businesses in Greater China. Chinese family firms often select a CEO or managing director from family members or friends to maintain close control on business groups and maintain social relationships with interested parties (Lien et al. 2005 , Liu et al. 2006 ). The familialoriented thought bring the outcome that directorship and top management positions are filled with family members or close friends rather than out side professionals. The outside appointments of directors create director affiliation but weaken the independence of the board committee, while independence is viewed as a vital factor to enhance the monitoring service of the board in AngloAmericans. Yeh and Woidtke (2005) provide evidence for the problem that divergence between cash-flow and control rights is more pronounced in family-controlled firms, which are more likely to retain affiliated directors than are non-familycontrolled firms 1 
Data and Methodology

Sample
The sample consists of listed firms in Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE) from 1999 to 2007. After excluding financial institutions, missing data, and truncating the samples at the first percentile, an unbalanced panel with 7,476 firm-year observations is used for our analysis. Table 1 shows that the observations include 28 industries, in which manufacturing accounts for over two-thirds and 3,633 observations come from electronics-related industries (TWSE code [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] . The manufacturing industry, specifically electronic manufacturing, have many tangible and intangible investments to meet production requirements and intense worldwide competition. Based on the corporate governance features of Taiwan and industry characteristics, this sample helps provide an understanding of the relationship between multiple directorships and investment decision. All data are drawn from the Taiwan Economic Journal data bank. Note: The listed industry types are utilized in regression model to control industry effects.
Methodology
We first specify our baseline model by equation 1:
FI is investment in plant and equipment for firm i during year t. CF is cash flow measured as a sum of operation income with depreciation and amortization. It measures the influence of cash flow on investmentcash flow sensitivity (Fazzari et al. 1988) . MD is the number of outside appointments of chairpersons in director and manager positions. The interaction term of cash flow and multiple directorships is utilized to investigate the impact of outside appointments on investment. Sale is annual sale to represent the impact of sale on investment (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001) . Debt is long-term debt to control its effect on investment (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). Investment and financial variables are scaled by the beginning of year-fixed asset (K).  and  are utilized to accounts for industry-fixed effects and time-fixed effects. As in (Fazzari and Peterson 1993), we apply two-stage-least squares regression (2SLS). Threestage-least squares (3SLS) method is also adopted to obtain more efficient coefficient estimation (Greene, 2008 ).
Summary Statistics
Outside Appointments of Chairpersons Table 2 shows the distribution of the outside appointments of chairpersons to director or manager positions. For total 7,476 observations, 79.40% (5,936) of chairpersons do not work for other companies as directors or managers at the same time. Of the chairpersons with outside appointments, 1,195 observations (78%) hold one or two outside seats. This means 22% of interlocked chairpersons hold three or more outside seats. Furthermore, the average number of outside appointments decreases from 2.1 for 1999 to 1.71 for 2007, indicating a decreasing trend in the number of multiple directorships in recent years. Financial Variables Table 3 provides summary statistics of financial variables. The average fixed asset investment ratio is 0.11 and ranges from 1.47 to 0, with standard deviation of 0.14. The high standard deviation indicates the variation of investment considerations between observations. The average internal cash flow ratio is 0.34 and ranges from 2.90 to -2.73, with standard deviation of 0.57. The wide range of cash flow illustrates the variation of company policies to keep internal cash flow. The average sales ratio and long-term debt ratio are 3.70 and 0.29, respectively. Note: FI is fixed asset investment of each period, Sale is annual sale amount, Debt is long-term debt, CF is cash flow measured as a sum of operation income with depreciation and amortization, K is the sum of tangible assets. Table 4 summarizes the regression results. The 2SLS coefficient on cash flow is significantly positive at the 1% level (coefficient 0.033, t=9.84). The result indicates that investment in Taiwanese firms depends on their generated cash flow, indicating the possibility of over-or underinvestment in Taiwanese firms. This baseline finding agrees with theoretical predictions and empirical findings in the US and the UK. The coefficient on interaction terms of cash flow and the number of multiple directorships (
Empirical Findings and Discussion
negative and statistically significant (coefficient -0.008, t=9.84). However, its economic significance is small because one standard deviation increase in multiple directorships decreases the investment-cash flow sensitivity by only 0.008. This implies that the number of multiple directorships does not affect investment-cash flow sensitivity in an economically meaningful way. The findings of 3SLS are similar to those of 2SLS. Note3: system weighted R-sq that adjusted by cross-model covariance matrix is applied for measuring goodness of fit of the model. Table 5 adapts Equation (1) by using a dummy variable MDdummy to observe the differential impact between firms with and without outside appointments. Overall, the findings in Tables 4 and Table 5 indicate that outside appointments are not economically relevant to investment for Taiwanese firms. This finding implies that the premise that outside appointments of chairpersons aggregate or alleviate managerial discretion problem on investment is not proven. The findings differ from those who argue ineffective monitoring caused by outside directorships (Fich and White, 2003) , but are in line with (Ferris et al. 2003) , which find no evidence that multiple directors evade their responsibilities to serve on board committees.
We provide two explanations for the economically insignificant effect of outside appointments on investment. First, a tradeoff effect of the advantage and disadvantage brought by multiple directorships may exist. As mentioned by Fich and White (2003) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) , busy directors may cause monitoring problems and inferior performance. However, their affiliation through outside appointments could help reduce information asymmetry, increase knowledge transfer, and obtain additional resources such as external funding. In Taiwan, most chairpersons have outside appointments of less than three seats (61% with one seat; 78% with one or two seats in this sample). This means the overall problem of monitoring effectiveness of the board might not be striking. The second explanation is the possibility that a significant monitoring effect on managerial discretionary behavior, either positive or negative, may be absent innately. Based on the culture of familial-oriented control in Taiwan, governance through interlocking directorates might be absent since chairpersons and directors are family members or friends. Sending them out to related parties, thus, centers more on strategy rather than monitoring. Note3: system weighted R-sq that adjusted by cross-model covariance matrix is applied for measuring goodness of fit of the model.
Conclusions
This paper examines whether the outside appointments of chairpersons affect managerial discretionary behavior on investment. Financial theories point that agency problem and information asymmetry cause the dependence of investment on internal cash flow. Board monitoring effectiveness is considered one of governance mechanisms to alleviate agency problem. However, monitoring effectiveness of outside appointment has been questioned recently. The Busyness Hypothesis proposes that outside appointments cause ineffective monitoring and inferior performance. In contrast, some studies suggest that directors" external appointments are associated with firm success or are irrelevant to performance. In Taiwan, the corporate governance system features a high concentration of ownership and family dominance. It is common practice for Taiwan firms to select CEOs or managing directors from family members to maintain close control on business groups or interested parties. Such outside appointments create director affiliation but weaken the independence of board committee, while independence is vital for the board to provide monitoring services among AngloAmericans.
Using a sample of 7,476 firm-year observations of Taiwan from 1999 to 2007, we observe that approximately 20% of observations with outside appointments. We find that internal cash flow is significantly related to investment. The results indicate that investment depends on generated cash flow and the possibility of an overinvestment or underinvestment in Taiwanese firms. However, our results suggest no economically significant relationship between outside appointments and investment-cash flow sensitivity. We provide two explanations for this finding. First, the advantage and disadvantage of multiple directorships might have tradeoff effects. Second, governance through interlocking directorates might be absent due to the familial strategy to build relationships rather for monitoring. Finally, we suggest that studies related to board effectiveness could be extended in area with a similar cultural context.
